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FACILITY FINANCING IN THE 1990s:





One of the challenges facing San Diego in the 1990s is finding the
best way to finance new public facilities in order to keep pace with the
city's rapid rate of development. The availability of effective financing
mechanisms to meet the needs of a rapidly growing community rests at
the center of the challenge because San Diego is one of the fastest
growing metropolitan areas in California.1 Based on current popula-
tion figures and forecasts,2 growth and continued development appear
inevitable.
For at least two years, public attention has centered on fundamental
growth and development issues. The question of whether to restrict
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1. Los Angeles Times, June 29, 1988, at 3, col. 6.
2. The population for the San Diego Metropolitan Statistical Area increased 31.4%
from 1960 to 1970, 37.1% from 1970 to 1980, 10.9% from 1980 to 1984. U.S. Bureau
of the Census. State and Metropolitan Area Data Book 22, 1986 U.S. Government
Printing Office; 1986.
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development and, if so, what restrictions to impose, was the initial
stage of San Diego's growth management policy. Reluctant decisions
of the City Council and the voters have permitted growth to proceed at
a "natural" pace.3 While public interest in growth and development
remains high, however, discussions are now shifting to the second step
in the growth management process: the facilities level of service, time
of construction and financing.
San Diego operates under a Progress Guide and General Plan
(Plan). The City Council has initiated review of the Plan, including the
Plan's guidelines for future development.4 The refusal of San Diego
voters and City Council members to slow the growth rate makes facil-
ity financing the primary focus of attention in the guidelines for devel-
opment. San Diego's growth management policies under the Plan
establish the parameters within which to create and judge financing
tools of the 1990s.
Planned, well-executed management of city growth is the key to
maintaining the quality of life for which San Diego has become fa-
mous. Well-articulated growth management policies, followed by fi-
nancial analyses that assure funding sources and tools to carry out the
policies, are essential to success. This Article will explore the San Di-
ego experience in the facility financing area.5 Part I reviews San Di-
ego's growth management history as the background for the
development of a financing strategy. Part II addresses the limitations
on local government revenue raising and spending imposed by the Cali-
fornia Constitution. Part III traces the legal standards and court deci-
sions associated with financing tools. Part IV then explores future
facility financing tools. The Article concludes that the pressures to cre-
ate local government-level financing will continue to exacerbate growth
management difficulties unless serious state law reform occurs.
3. See infra Part I.B. for discussion of voters' rejection of antigrowth propositions.
4. The guidelines include a comprehensive analysis of the problems and issues of
growth. The guidelines address how this growth affects the fiscal resources of the City
as well as the physical and social pattern of development. The results of this analysis,
originally undertaken in 1975, plus the comments and suggestions introduced by indi-
vidual citizens, property owners and business groups, evolved into a program for man-
aging future development in the City of San Diego. Progress Guide and General Plan of
San Diego, Cal., Guidelines for Future Development (approved February 26, 1979).
5. This Article will focus on public improvements for which the City of San Diego
has direct responsibility. Therefore, the Article will not include a discussion of financ-






During the 1960s, growth in the San Diego area rapidly accelerated.6
Growth exacted a price. Commuting time and congestion increased,
small sewage treatment plants became obsolete, and the city was re-
quired to import increasing quantities of water. Schools, fire stations,
parks and branch libraries were not ready once new residents moved
into their tract homes.
In response to the situation, the San Diego City Council approved
the first Progress Guide and General Plan. Voters challenged and re-
jected the Plan by referendum in 1965. The City Council ultimately
approved a weakened version of the General Plan which the electorate
ratified in 1967. The 1967 Plan contained a series of principal objec-
tives which formed the basis for the plan and the 1979 growth manage-
ment program. The objectives included: (1) creation of a strong
central core; (2) development of a more compact city; (3) prevention of
sprawl; (4) encouragement of greater variety and choice in living envi-
ronment; (5) promotion of a more handsome environment; (6) recogni-
tion of the importance of San Diego's harbor; and (7) preservation of
open space systems.7
In 1971, a municipal election changed the face of San Diego city
government by installing a new mayor and several new City Council
members. The new city officials were committed to a change in growth
policies, primarily suburban growth and the inadequacies of public fa-
cilities in the suburbs. The new Council permitted development only
on the condition that a financing plan accompany development of each
community plan area. The Council's policy attempted to assure that
public facilities and services would be developed concurrently with the
need generated by the new homes and jobs. All new facilities were to
be funded from revenue flowing from the new community itself, with-
out invading the City's general tax revenue base. This "pay as you
grow" philosophy has become the established theme of San Diego's
growth management program.
In the mid-1970s, environmentalist groups began lobbying the Coun-
6. San Diego's percentage change in population from 1960 to 1970 was 31.4%.
U.S. Bureau of the Census. State and Metropolitan Area Data Bank 22, 1986 U.S.
Government Printing Office: 1986.
7. Progress Guide and General Plan of San Diego, CaL, 71-73 (approved July 20,
1967).
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cil to adopt growth control legislation. An initiative petition was circu-
lated which proposed limiting San Diego's growth to the City's "fair
share of the nation's growth," an amount equal to the national growth
rate. The initiative generated insufficient support to place the issue on
the ballot. The initiative did, however, focus sufficient attention on the
growth problems to induce a commitment from the mayor and council
to address the issue in the form of a new General Plan.
The San Diego Growth Management Program was designed to ac-
commodate the City's fair share of the region's natural growth. The
program's intended underlying limitation on the City's growth was the
availability of public facilities, as financed through the development
process. The City's program was solely a residential growth manage-
ment program, limited to new housing developments. Although the
program assumed new commercial and industrial development would
carry a share of needed public improvement costs, the Council viewed
commercial and industrial development as having no direct impact on
the need for schools, parks and libraries.
The program for guiding growth recommended division of the City
into three planning areas or tiers: "urbanized," "planned urbanizing"
and "future urbanizing." The urbanized area includes the central
downtown portion of San Diego, as well as some older communities.
Land-use and transportation patterns in this tier illustrate the need for
an area to function as a regional center. The urbanized tier is designed
for diverse land uses; in particular, employment uses such as office,
administrative, financial and entertainment uses, as well as nearby resi-
dential areas. The urbanized area emphasizes redevelopment and new
construction as a way of conserving the social and environmental char-
acteristics of the area and rehabilitating deteriorated neighborhoods.'
The second tier identified by the Guidelines for Future Development
was the planned urbanizing area. It consists of communities where de-
velopment is already under way but not yet complete. The objective
for this tier includes identifying the additional public investment neces-
sary to complete development, as well as calculating for the growth of
communities already served by existing capital facilities. Land in this
area should be developed in a manner similar to the urbanized tier,
through the orderly extension of public facilities and the provision of
housing for a variety of income levels.9
8. Progress Guide and General Plan of San Diego, Cal., Guidelines for Future De-




The third tier includes vacant land zoned primarily for agriculture.
The undeveloped land is to be held for urban reserve and will be re-
leased for development as the planned urbanizing communities expand.
The objective of the future urbanizing tier is to avoid premature urban-
ization and to conserve the natural environment and fiscal resources by
precluding sprawling development. 1
The Growth Management Program, which focused on the urban-
ized, planned urbanizing and future urbanizing areas of the City, in-
cluded development guidelines and goals for each. The City Council
incorporated the program into a new Progress Guide and General
Plan, to be effective in 1979. A challenge to the legality of the plan and
the Growth Management Program was settled out of court without
any substantial impact on the plan.
Following adoption of the Progress Guide and General Plan, which
incorporated the Guidelines for Future Development, San Diego was
confronted with an event which complicated the plan's implementa-
tion. In 1978, before the effective date of the Plan, California voters
adopted the Jarvis-Gann Property Tax Limitation Initiative (Proposi-
tion 13). " Proposition 13 caused a significant reduction in the City's
property tax revenue and made the problem of devising financing pro-
grams for newly developing communities and improving public service
levels in older communities a far more difficult task.
The City Council responded to Proposition 13 with the Facilities
Benefit Assessment (FBA) concept. The concept involves placing spe-
cial assessments on land planned for development, with the assess-
ments creating a fund for facility improvements and extensions. The
City began by adopting an enabling ordinance to exact fees in the
planned urbanizing tier. At the same time, the Council prepared plans
for public facility financing in the urbanizing tier. The process re-
quired review and update of many community plans and a detailed
inventory of the public facilities needed to serve the planned new
growth.
The FBA approach to public facilities financing was novel in Califor-
nia in the late 1970s. Upon the advice of the city attorney, the City
commenced an action to validate the procedure. The appellate courts
approved it in the summer of 1984, in . W. Jones Companies v. City of
10. Id.
11. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA (West 1990). For discussion of Proposition 13, see
infra Part II.A.
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San Diego12 and City of San Diego v. Holodnak.13 Both decisions are
frequently cited in California and nationally with regard to financing
and managing growth costs in developing urban and suburban areas.
14
In 1984, the Growth Management Review Task Force began evalu-
ating the first five years of the City's experience with the 1979 Progress
Guide and General Plan and the various implementation policies, ordi-
nances and regulations that had been adopted pursuant to the Plan.
The task force concluded that community plans could accommodate
projected growth until the year 2000,15 when it would be necessary to
open more land for development. The task force also found that public
facility financing mechanisms used in planned urbanizing areas were
reasonably equitable and provided adequate service levels to accommo-
date development.16 In the urbanized areas, however, the task force
concluded that services and facilities had not kept pace with growth
and did not meet General Plan standards.1 7
Unfortunately, the task force report was overshadowed in September
1984, when a divided City Council approved the shift of 5,100 acres
located in the northern portion of the City from future urbanizing to
planned urbanizing. The target of the shift was a ninety-one acre pro-
ject in La Jolla Valley. The approval of the shift caused a voter initia-
tive effort, Proposition A, to overturn the Council's decision and
prohibit other phase shifts without voter approval. Although vigor-
ously opposed, Proposition A was adopted by the electorate in Novem-
ber 1985.18 Voter approval of this stringent measure sent a clear
message to the City Council that growth management has a high public
priority.
12. 157 Cal. App. 3d 745, 203 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1984).
13. 157 Cal. App. 3d 759, 203 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1984).
14. See infra Part III.B.4. for a detailed discussion of the FBA and the cases up-
holding the concept.
15. Growth Management Review Task Force of San Diego, Cal., Task Force Report
to the City Council 4 (Dec. 1984).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Amendment to Progress Guide and General Plan of San Diego, Cal. (approved
November 5, 1985). Proposition A's validity was challenged in a lawsuit filed by the La
Jolla Valley landowners, later voluntarily dismissed without prejudice.
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B. Current Policies on Growth Management:
The Shift to Financing
In January 1987, the City Council approved a program to reevaluate
the City's growth management policies and update the City's Progress
Guide and General Plan. The objective was to formulate a new strat-
egy for the City's next twenty years. To assist in the effort, the Mayor
and City Council appointed a Citizens Advisory Committee for
Growth and Development, comprised of representatives from the busi-
ness sector, community plan areas, the development industry and envi-
ronmental groups, as well as educators and interested citizens.
The Citizens Advisory Committee's goal was to maintain the status
quo and moderate the rapid rate of development while a period of
study and analysis occurred. Pursuant to the City's police power au-
thority, 19 the City instituted a control mechanism to prevent a rush of
development that might frustrate the ultimate policies established pur-
suant to General Plan revisions. Following lengthy and heated public
hearings, the City Council in 1987 introduced and adopted the Interim
Development Control Ordinance (IDO).20
As adopted, the IDO applied to all areas of the city: urbanized,
planned urbanizing and future urbanizing. Narrower in scope than the
three tiers in the General Plan, the IDO focused solely upon residential
development2" and imposed a limit of 8,000 dwelling units per year in
San Diego. This annual number was then allocated to individual com-
munity plan areas.22
While the IDO moderated the rate of development, work continued
on what was hoped would be a permanent solution. The 1988 General
Election contained three measures on the ballot, sponsored by three
different public and private organizations, directly relating to growth
management.
One measure, Proposition H, was placed on the ballot by the City
Council and would have amended the Progress Guide and General
Plan by adding a growth management element. The specific question
presented to the voters was:
Shall the City adopt a Growth Management Element which:
19. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (Deering 1981); SAN DIEGO CITY CHARTER art. I, § 2
(1931).
20. SAN DIEGO, CAL., AMENDED ORDINANCES No. 0-17015 (1988).
21. Id. at § 3.
22. Id. at § 4 and Schedule 4.
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a. Establishes a maximum limit for the next five years of 3,600
new residential units per year, and 3,990 previously approved resi-
dential units per year;
b. Protects single-family neighborhoods by restricting new
development;
c. Preserves environmentally sensitive lands, including wet-
lands, floodplains, steep slopes, biologically sensitive lands and
significant prehistoric and historic sites;
d. Requires that traffic generated by new development stay
within roadway capacity;
e. Strengthens community plans by requiring periodic com-
prehensive updates and limiting amendments between updates;
f. Requires there be adequate public facilities and services at
the time of development; and
g. Establishes regional goals for air quality, water, sewage
treatment, solid waste disposal and transportation?
The second group, Citizens for Limited Growth, prepared
Proposition J, which asked the voters:
Until standards as designated in the initiative are met, shall the
City:
a. Limit residential dwelling units as follows:
FY 1988-89: 7,000 to 9,000 dwelling units
FY 1989-90: 6,000 to 8,000 dwelling units
FY 1990-91: 5,000 to 7,000 dwelling units
FY 1991-92 and each subsequent fiscal year through the
FY 2009-
2010: 4,000 to 6,000 dwelling units;
b. Develop and implement a plan for industrial and com-
mercial development consistent with the criteria in the initiative;
c. Develop and implement an allocation system for residen-
tial development as provided in the initiative;
d. Preserve sensitive environmental lands as provided in the
initiative;
e. Adopt a plan for the ultimate development of the City's
sphere of influence as provided in the initiative?
Finally, the San Diego County Board of Supervisors placed an advi-
sory vote, Proposition C, before the electorate which asked: "Should
the Regional Planning and Growth Control Measure be adopted?"
Proposition C attempted to demonstrate public support for the idea
that certain impacts associated with growth should be resolved on a
regional basis. It proposed the establishment of a Regional Planning
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol38/iss1/5
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and Growth Management Review Board, which would formulate a re-
gional growth management plan to deal with transportation manage-
ment, solid waste disposal, water reclamation, sewage disposal, air
quality and growth inducing industrial zoning. Each city within the
San Diego region and San Diego County23 would participate in the
formulation of, and would comply with, the adopted regional growth
management plan.
Propositions H and J failed to receive a majority vote while Proposi-
tion C passed by sixty percent. Consensus analysis of the election re-
sults told legislators that the voters favored a regional approach to
growth management without caps on the amount of residential con-
struction permitted annually.
Confronted only with the passage of an advisory measure, the City
Council faced a difficult decision in what components of Proposition H
to implement. Whether to proceed with all or a portion of the growth
management program contained in Proposition H became a difficult
and time consuming process. Although the Growth Management Ele-
ment, Proposition H, did not receive a majority vote, the City Council
recognized that the voters desired responsible, well-executed manage-
ment of growth and development. The Council decided to implement
many of the recommendations incorporated in the proposed growth
management element. The growth management program ultimately
adopted by the City Council directed the City Manager and Planning
Director to proceed with implemention of a variety of actions which
focus on neighborhood preservation, environmentally sensitive lands
public facilities and transportation.
The goal of neighborhood preservation had many components but
focused on the Single Family Neighborhood Protection Ordinance, en-
acted by the City Council at the same time that Proposition H was
placed on the ballot. The legislation acknowledged that there are resi-
dences in the City which are primarily single-family in character, but
which are zoned for multi-family residential uses. Increasingly, single-
family neighborhoods in multi-family zoned areas are being converted
to multi-family and nonresidential uses.
The Council apparently decided that continued multi-family and
nonresidential development at densities permitted by the existing zon-
ing would threaten the character of existing single-family neighbor-
hoods. Using the ordinance, the City sought to identify all
23. The County of San Diego includes 18 incorporated cities plus unincorporated
areas.
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neighborhoods to be protected by single-family zoning under a pro-
gram designated "Protected Single-Family Neighborhoods." During
post-election discussions, the Council reaffirmed its commitment to the
program and pledged policy and financial support to ensure its success-
ful completion.
A major inconsistency in the policy should be noted. To reduce the
pressure leading to urban sprawl in a rapidly growing urban area, in-
creased density in existing parts of the community is necessary. Pro-
tests by residents of older neighborhoods resisting densification, where
density makes sense in terms of overall growth control, is difficult for
elected officials to ignore. The result is contradictory policies which
permit as little development as possible in the future urbanizing tier
and, at the same time, refuse densification in significant urbanized ar-
eas where the overall growth management strategy calls for it. No so-
lution to such a political dilemma has been offered. Indeed, the
dilemma itself is rarely publicly addressed.
Early discussions at the City Council made it clear that the Mayor
and the Council would support added environmental protection. The
Council adopted an ordinance that was modified with many of the pro-
visions of Proposition H and was enacted on a permanent basis as the
Resource Protection Ordinance.24 The ordinance prevents all con-
struction or demolition within certain environmentally sensitive zones
without a resource protection permit.
The City Council also wanted the option to reimpose an IDO-style
building permit allocation system. In an attempt to prepare for future
needs the Council introduced and adopted the Procedural Ordinance
for Interim Development Control in 1989.25 The Council expressed a
need for this ordinance in order to protect the public health, safety and
welfare and to prevent unplanned development that would exacerbate
further public facility and service problems. The ordinance sought an
orderly and phased buildout consistent with applicable community
plans and regional growth forecasts.
The effective implementation of the procedural ordinance for interim
development control depends on adequate development monitoring.
When making growth management decisions, established procedures
for regular monitoring of development activity are necessary to ensure
that rapid development does not adversely affect the public health,
24. San Diego Municipal Code § 101.0462 (1989).
25. San Diego Municipal Code § 101.0260 (1989).
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safety and welfare. While the Council's directive did not include a spe-
cific enactment, City management in the affected departments received
a strong message. The City's building inspection, planning, and engi-
neering and development departments are all involved in tracking final
maps, rezonings, subdivision approvals, building, grading and other
permits.
Another component of the growth management element related to
management of transportation demand. The Council added an ordi-
nance to implement the first program component of San Diego's com-
prehensive plan for transportation management.26  The first
component specifies employer, building owner and developer require-
ments for vehicle trip reductions and contributions to help comply
with federal and state mandated clean air standards through transpor-
tation demand management. The program attempts to reduce traffic
congestion and improve air quality by decreasing the number of em-
ployees who drive their cars to work during peak periods. It regulates
development of parking facilities and requires employers to monitor
employee transportation arrangements.
As a final action in resolving the first step in growth management
issues, the Council established the Citizens Finance Committee, thus
making the transition to the second step in the growth management
process: facilities financing. A cherished goal of advocates of "pay as
you go" development is that all public facilities and services necessary
to support newly built residential areas be in place when the first new
residents arrive. It is doubtful that the goal is practical in light of the
population densities needed to finance initial development of the facili-
ties and services. San Diego's brief history offers no example of a new
development of significant size having met this goal.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATATIONS
A. Proposition 13
In June 1978, California voters adopted the previously mentioned
taxation limitation initiative, commonly called Proposition 13. It ad-
ded Article XIIIA to the California Constitution,27 which significantly
reduced state and local taxing authority and made public financing
problems in newly developing and older communities much more
difficult.
26. San Diego Municipal Code § 71.0101-71.0161 (1989).
27. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA (Deering 1989).
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Proposition 13 limits ad valorem property tax rates to one percent of
"full cash value" of the property, plus an amount for any indebtedness
approved by the voters prior to the measure's July 1, 1978 effective
date. Subsequent tax rate increases are permitted only for bonded in-
debtedness for the purpose of acquisition or improvement of real prop-
erty approved by a two-thirds vote of the electorate. It also limits
increases in assessed valuation to two percent per year and provides
that reassessment to a new "appraised value" is permitted only on
change of ownership or new construction. Finally, Proposition 13 pro-
hibits state and local governments from imposing any new ad valorem
taxes and requires a two-thirds vote of the electorate to impose "special
taxes."
Proposition 13 was promptly challenged, but the California Supreme
Court, exercising original jurisdiction due to the great importance of
the issues, upheld the constitutionality of the initiative in Amador Val-
ley Joint Union High School District v. State Board of Equalization.28
The challengers, government agencies and concerned private citizens,
argued that the initiative was invalid for a number of reasons including:
(1) Proposition 13 is a constitutional revision, not an amendment, and
cannot be adopted through the initiative process; (2) it violates the
state constitutional requirement that an initiative must not contain
more than one subject; (3) it violates equal protection of the laws; (4) it
violates the right to travel; (5) it constitutes an unlawful impairment of
contracts; (6) the title and summary of the initiative are misleading;
and (7) it is too vague to be rationally and uniformly implemented and
interpreted. The court, in a limited inquiry, examined "only those
principal, fundamental challenges to the validity of Article XIIIA as a
whole "and rejected all of the alleged deficiencies."29
Proposition 13 has a drastic impact on local government because it
restricts availability of revenue and limits the ability to impose new
taxes. As discussed later,30 however, California courts have deter-
mined that, while the language of Article XIIIA is ambiguous on the
subject, Proposition 13 does not limit "special assessments" which re-
main a viable financing tool for local improvements.
The Amador the court, although upholding its validity, narrowly
construed Proposition 13's purpose as effecting only "real property tax
28. 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978).
29. Id. at 219, 583 P.2d at 1283, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 241.
30. See infra Part III.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol38/iss1/5
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relief."31 The court found Section 4, which limited the ability of local
government to impose "special taxes" by requiring a two-thirds vote,
to be related functionally to real property taxation relief. This is so
because Section 4 limits the ability of local governments, by imposing
nonproperty taxes, to replace the revenues lost as a result of the
initiative.
In Los Angeles County Transportation Commission v. Richmond32
the court held that Section 4 should be construed narrowly, with ambi-
guities resolved in favor of "cities," "counties" and "special districts."
The local governments should be permitted to enact "special taxes"
because of the "fundamentally undemocratic nature of the requirement
for an extraordinary majority." 3 Thus, the court upheld the Los An-
geles County Transportation Commission's imposition of a "retail
transaction and use tax" with a majority, but less than two-thirds vote.
The tax was imposed to finance an efficient public transportation sys-
tem in Southern California. The court determined that "special dis-
trict" as used in Section 4 encompasses only entities empowered to levy
a property tax.
Then, in City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell,34 the California
Supreme Court narrowed the definition of "special taxes." A majority
of San Francisco's voters, but less than two-thirds, had approved an
extension of the expiration date of payroll and gross receipts tax in-
creases. The proceeds were placed in the general fund to be used for
general governmental purposes. The court held that the process used
by San Francisco did not create a "special tax" requiring two-thirds
voter approval. "Special taxes" are those "levied for a specific pur-
pose," rather than a levy placed in a general fund to be used for gov-
ernmental purposes.35
1. Proposition 62.
In response to Farrell, the voters approved Proposition 62 in No-
vember 1986 which was clearly an attempt to restrict the application of
the Farrell decision. Proposition 62 is a statutory revision, not a con-
stitutional amendment. It provides that all taxes are either "general"
31. 22 Cal. 3d at 230, 583 P.22 at 1283, 149 Cal Rptr. at 248.
32. 31 Cal. 3d 197, 643 P.2d 941, 182 Cal. Rptr. 324 (1982).
33. Id. at 205, 643 P.2d at 945, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
34. 32 Cal. 3d 47, 648 P.2d 935, 184 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1982).
35. Id. at 57, 648 P.2d at 940, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
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or "special." Special taxes, consistent with Proposition 13, require a
two-thirds vote of the local electorate. General taxes, however, require
a two-thirds vote of the local legislative body and a majority vote of the
voters voting in the election.
San Diego and other California charter cities36 have determined that
Proposition 62 does not apply to them.3 7 As far as general law cities
are concerned, the constitutionality of the provision of Proposition 62
requiring voter approval is suspect based on article II, section 9(a), of
the California Constitution which exempts tax levies from the referen-
dum power.3 8
2. Equal Protection Standards.
Although Proposition 13 withstood constitutional challenges ini-
tially, new decisional law may support renewed equal protection chal-
lenges. In Amador the California Supreme Court held an equal
protection challenge to Proposition 13 was premature, but nevertheless
36. A state may grant municipalities "home rule" powers which enable the inhabit-
ants of the locality the power to frame a charter for local government. The purpose of
the home rule power is to eliminate the authority of the legislature over the municipal-
ity, and to bestow on the municipalities the power of local self-government as to all
"municipal concerns" that are not in conflict with the constitution or applicable general
laws. MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 3.21 (3d ed. 1987). In California
this power is given by CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7.
37. Upon review, the Attorney General and the Legislative Analyst both concluded
that, in their view, the measure was inapplicable to charter cities and placed comments
to that effect in their analysis for the sample ballot prepared for the November 1986
election. Mr. Howard Jarvis, a major proponent of the measure, filed an action of man-
damus seeking to delete these comments in the sample ballot. Following a hearing in
August 1986, the Superior Court denied the writ on the grounds that the subject matter
of the initiative (taxation and elections) was a "municipal affair" and as a statutory
enactment could not apply to charter cities. Based on this, and the cases of A.B.C.
Distrib. Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 15 Cal. 3d 566, 542 P.2d 625, 125
Cal. Rptr. 465 (1975), and Sonoma County Org. of Pub. Employees v. County of So-
noma, 23 Cal. 3d 296, 591 P.2d 1, 152 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1979), it was determined that
Proposition 62 does not apply to San Diego, as a chartered city. San Diego Op. City
Att'y 903 (1987).
38. See D. CURTIN, CALIFORNIA LAND-USE AND PLANNING LAW 140 (1989). In
City of Westminster v. County of Orange, 204 Cal. App. 3d 623, 251 Cal. Rptr. 511
(1988), the court invalidated the "window period" provision of Proposition 62. Curtain
concludes that "as a result of the reasoning contained in City of Westminster, Proposi-
tion 62's voter approval requirements for general taxes is probably invalid; however, the
two-thirds vote requirement for special taxes clearly survives City of Westminster be-
cause it merely parallels Article XIIIA, section 4, of the California Constitution." CUR-
TIN, supra, at 141.
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decided Proposition 13 withstood a facial constitutional attack.39 The
argument that Proposition 13 denies equal protection states that, by
the "rollback" of assessed value to the 1975-76 fiscal year, two substan-
tially identical homes, located side-by-side and receiving the same level
of governmental services, will be assessed and taxed at different levels
depending on their date of acquisition.
The Amador court held that the system of taxation under Proposi-
tion 13 had the rational basis required by the constitution. Basing
property taxes on the value of the property when acquired except for
property bought prior to 1975, which is assessed at the 1975-76 full
cash value, is
fair and equitable in that [the property owner's] future taxes may
be said reasonably to reflect the price [the buyer] was originally
willing and able to pay for his property, rather than an inflated
value fixed, after acquisition, in part on the basis of sales to third
parties over which sales he can exercise no control. 4°
Thus, the court said there was a reasonable basis for the assessment
and Proposition 13 withstood the facial attack, although the court left
open the question of another challenge should an actual controversy
arise.
Recently, the United States Supreme Court considered a similar
challenge to a taxation scheme in West Virginia. In Allegheny Pitts-
burgh Coal Co. v. County Commission of Webster County,41 the Court
held that the disparity in property taxes for similarly situated property
violates the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution. The West
Virginia Constitution provides, with certain exceptions, that taxation
must be equal and uniform and that property be taxed in proportion to
its value. The Webster County method of tax assessment instead taxed
newly acquired property based on its purchase price. The County
scheme made only minor adjustments to property which had not been
recently sold, resulting in gross disparities of eight to thirty-five times
the assessed value for similar properties.
In reaching its decision that the scheme violated equal protection,
the Court stated that states have broad taxing powers, and "[i]n each
case, the constitutional requirement is the reasonable attainment of a
rough equality in tax treatment of similarly situated property own-
39. Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22
Cal. 3d 208, 233, 583 P.2d 1281, 1292, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 250 (1978).
40. Id. at 235, 583 P.2d at 1293, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 251.
41. 109 S. Ct. 633 (1989).
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ers.' '42 A state may divide different kinds of property into classes with
different tax burdens as long as the divisions and burdens are reason-
able. The Court held that the procedure for assessment used in Web-
ster County was not reasonable and therefore violated the equal
protection rights of the owners of newly purchased properties.
It is not yet clear what impact Allegheny Pittsburgh will have in Cali-
fornia. The case does, however, open to question the validity of Propo-
sition 13. The Court, in a footnote, said:
[W]e need not and do not decide today whether the Webster
County assessment method would stand on a different footing if it
were the law of a state, generally applied, instead of the aberra-
tional enforcement policy it appears to be. The State of California
has adopted a similar policy known as Article XIIIA of its Consti-
tution, popularly known as 'Proposition 13.'... The system is
grounded on the belief that taxes should be based on the original
cost of property and should not tax unrealized paper gains in the
value of the property."43
Although the California Supreme Court upheld Proposition 13 in
Amador, the lawsuit involved only a facial challenge to the initiative.
Now actual controversies have arisen. In fact, there is currently litiga-
tion over the equal protection issue in three California counties. In San
Diego County, a corporation purchased property for $730,000 in No-
vember 1987. The tax base prior to its purchase of the property was
$175,839, approximately one quarter of the base after the sale. There-
fore, the corporate plaintiff is alleging the tax system mandated by
Proposition 13 is invidiously discriminatory because the corporation
bears a disproportionately greater tax burden than similarly situated
property owners. The trial court granted the defendants' demurrer
with prejudice on the basis that Amador was controlling." The plain-
tiff has appealed the ruling, which is pending as of this writing.
Other challenges to Proposition 13 have occurred in Contra Costa
County and Los Angeles. A Contra Costa property owner is gathering
information to enter a stipulation with the county to measure the dis-
parity in the assessed value of similarly situated property. In Los An-
geles, a lawyer who bought a Baldwin Hills home discovered her taxes
42. Id. at 638.
43. Id. at 638 n.4.
44. Northwest Fin., Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization and San Diego County, No.
611092 (San Diego Superior Court, Order Sustaining Demurrer of San Diego County
and the Demurrer of the State Board of Equalization without Leave to Amend and
Directing Entry of Judgment, Sept. 14, 1989).
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were five times that of a neighbor. A lawsuit ensued and has followed a
course similar to the San Diego case. When confronted with the same
Proposition 13 issue, another trial court granted the defendant's de-
murrer on the basis that Amador was controlling.45
Whatever the final outcome of Proposition 13 challenges, property
taxes will remain unable to fund capital facilities for new growth as
well as existing services. Alternative methods to finance infrastructure
and accommodate growth therefore remain an important governmental
goal. Proposition 13 supporters steadfastly maintain that property
taxes collected in California under the measure have surpassed both
the inflation rates and population growth. Be that as it may, public
treasuries have been unable to satisfy the growing public need for new
and enhanced facilities and services.
B. The Gann Limit
During a special statewide election in November 1979, California's
voters approved the Gann Initiative, which added Article XIIIB to the
California Constitution.46 Its purpose was to protect citizens from ex-
cessive taxation and to curb excessive governmental spending.47
Article XIIIB limits increases in annual spending of state and local
taxes to a level equal to changes in population and the national cost of
living. Due to California's higher rate of inflation, the effect of the
Gann limit has been to force a decrease in real per capita tax appropri-
ations. Appropriations subject to the limitation do not include debt
service or appropriations required to comply with court or federal gov-
ernment mandates. Appropriations received in excess of the limit are
required to be turned over to school districts.48 Section 4 provides for
a waiver of the "Gann limit." The Gann limit waiver, however, re-
quires a popular vote and is limited to four years. Upon expiration of
the waiver time period, the Gann limit either is reapplied or a further
vote to extend the waiver is required.
Article XIIIB does not limit the spending of funds from all sources;
it only limits the authorization to spend "proceeds of taxes." In
45. Nordlinger v. Los Angeles County (L.A. S.Ct., filed Sept. 28, 1989).
46. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIB (Deering 1989).
47. Huntington Park Redev. Agency v. Martin, 38 Cal. 3d 100, 109, 695 P.2d 220,
225, 211 Cal. Rptr. 133, 138 (1985).
48. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIB, § 2(a). Previously, the excess tax revenues were re-
turned to the taxpayers. Proposition 98, effective Nov. 9, 1988, changed that law.
1990]
Washington University Open Scholarship
132 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 38:115
County of Placer v. Corin,49 the court held "special assessments" are
not "proceeds of taxes" and, therefore, are not included for purposes of
the spending limitation. The court stated that "proceeds of taxes"
were those charges levied to raise general revenues for the local entity.
Otherwise, the court said, local governments would be deprived of the
ability to fund the construction of major improvements for a particular
area within their jurisdictions."
The June 1990 ballot will contain some proposed changes to the
Gann limit in the form of a constitutional amendment. The proposed
changes are part of a budget compromise between the Governor and
legislature.51 The compromise attempts to answer concerns that the
Gann limit is too restrictive and that it restricts California's ability to
finance the service and facility needs of its growing population.
A significant change would liberalize the annual adjustment to the
spending limit, currently based on the change in cost of living and pop-
ulation. The proposed amendment would be tied more closely to eco-
nomic growth; measuring the cost of living by the change in California
per capita personal income, instead of by the Consumer Price Index.
In addition, local governments will have the option to measure the
change in personal income by the percentage change from the prior
year of the local assessment roll for nonresidential property.52 Despite
the prospect of some liberalization of Gann initiative limits, other fi-
nancing means will remain important to the achievement of any policy
that new development must "pay its own way." The remaining sec-
tions discuss how such a policy can be accomplished.
III. THE APPLICABLE LAW-CASE DISCUSSION
In order to meet public service needs in a growing community, mu-
nicipalities have been forced to identify or, in many cases, invent le-
gally acceptable financing mechanisms. Courts have had to balance the
government interests in providing services such as parks, roads,
schools, libraries and police and fire protection against the due process,
equal protection and other property rights of developers. Discussion of
the fees, assessments, land dedications and other methods of financing
49. 113 Cal. App. 3d 443, 170 Cal. Rptr. 232 (1980).
50. Id. at 453, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 242.




public facilities and services made necessary by development are
lumped under the general term "exactions."
A. Authority
In evaluating the validity of exactions, courts first must determine
whether the municipality imposing a condition amounting to an exac-
tion had the authority to do so in the first place. 3 In California, such
authority is found in the home rule powers given municipalities in the
state constitution.54 Article XI, § 7 of the California Constitution pro-
vides that "[a] county or city may make and enforce within its limits all
local, police, sanitary and other ordinances and regulations not in con-
ifict with general laws." Courts have interpreted the constitutional po-
lice power to include land use regulation. As one court stated: "A
city's desire to 'grow at an orderly pace and in a compact manner' is
clearly encompassed within the concept of 'public welfare.' ,,5
In Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek,56 the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court found within the state's police powers a statu-
tory scheme requiring land dedication or, in lieu, fees as a condition to
subdivision approval. 7 Since Walnut Creek, California courts have
generally upheld the authority of municipalities to require developers
of property to pay impact fees.58
53. See, eg. Morgan, Strauss and Leitner, State Impact Fee Legislation, LAND USE
L., Jan. 1988, at 3; Smith, From Subdivision Improvement Requirements to Community
Benefit Assessments and Linkage Payments: A Brief History of Land Development Exac-
tions, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 9-10 (1987); Callies, Review Essay: Impact Fees,
Exactions and Paying for Growth in Hawaii, 11 U. HAw. L. REv. 295, 307 (1989); CAL.
CoNsT. art. XI, § 7.
54. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7.
55. Griffin Dev. Co. v. City of Oxnard, 39 Cal. 3d 256, 266, 703 P.2d 339, 344, 217
Cal. Rptr. 1, 6, (1985) (citing Dateline Builders, Inc. v. City of Santa Rosa, 146 Cal.
App. 3d 520, 528, 194 Cal. Rptr. 258, 263 (1983)). Griffin involved the regulation of
converting apartments into condominiums.
56. 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971).
57. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11546 (West 1987) provided: "The governing body
of a city or county may by ordinance require the dedication of land, the payment of fees
in lieu thereof, or a combination of both, for park and recreational purposes as a condi-
tion to the approval of a final subdivision map .... "
58. Callies, supra note 53, at 308. See, eg., Trent Meredith, Inc. v. City of Oxnard,
114 Cal. App. 3d 317, 170 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1981) (school impact fees); Candid Enter.
Inc. v. Grossmont Union High School Dist., 39 Cal. 3d 878, 705 P.2d 876, 218 Cal.
Rptr. 303 (1985) (school impact fees); J.W. Jones Cos. v. City of San Diego, 157 Cal.
App. 3d 745, 203 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1984); City of San Diego v. Holodnak, 157 Cal. App.
3d 759, 203 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1984).
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B. Nexus Analysis
Once a court determines a municipality has authority to impose a
condition or charge a fee amounting to an "exaction," it must deter-
mine whether the action violates of the state or federal constitution. 9
The constitutional issues generally involve whether there has been a
violation of due process or equal protection, a taking without "just
compensation" or whether a fee is a "special tax" requiring two-thirds
voter approval pursuant to Proposition 13.60
The determination to uphold an exaction ordinance involves issues
of reasonableness. There must be a reasonable relationship, or
"nexus," between the condition imposed or fee charged and the need
generated by the new development. The California "reasonable rela-
tionship" test is broader than rules of other states.61 The condition or
fee will be upheld as long as "the amount and location of land or fees
shall bear a reasonable relationship to the use of the facilities by the
future inhabitants" of the development.62
1. Off-Site Exactions.
As early as 1949, in Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles,63 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court upheld a city's imposition of conditions for ap-
proval of a subdivision. As required by the Subdivision Map Act, the
developer submitted a tentative map to the city planning commission
to subdivide thirteen acres. The commission attached four conditions
to approval of the subdivision, including dedication of a street located
outside the subdivision. Over the developer's objections, the court held
that "conditions are lawful which are not inconsistent with the [Subdi-
59. Morgan, Strauss and Leitner, supra note 53, at 4.
60. Proposition 13 provides: "Cities, counties and special districts, by a two-thirds
vote of the qualified electors of such district, may impose special taxes on such district,
except ad valorem taxes on real property or a transaction tax or sales tax on the sale of
real property within such city, county or special district." CAL. CONsT. art. XIIIA, § 4.
61. Callies, supra note 53, at 300; Morgan, Strauss and Leitner, supra note 53, at 4.
The strictest standard, adopted by Illinois, requires the fee to be "specifically and
uniquely attributable" to the proposed development. Thus, in Illinois, the "rational
nexus" test requires the new development to create a need which bears a proportionate
relationship to the fee or condition and the funds must be properly earmarked towards
the stated needs. Callies, supra note 53, at 300; Morgan, Strauss and Leitner, supra
note 53, at 4.
62. Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 640, 484 P.2d
606, 615, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 635 (1971).
63. 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
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vision] Map Act and the ordinances and are reasonably required by the
subdivision type and use as related to the character of local and neigh-
borhood planning and traffic conditions."
64
Rejecting the argument that the conditions amount to an exercise of
the power of eminent domain, the court noted the importance of uni-
formity of neighborhood design and plan. In addition, the court ex-
plained that each subdivision adds to the traffic burden, so it did not
matter that the conditions imposed benefit the city as a whole. The
court stated that it is also appropriate to consider future population
needs and that it was the subdivider who was seeking the advantages of
subdividing. Therefore, he had the duty to comply with reasonable
conditions "so as to conform to the safety and general welfare of the lot
owners in the subdivision and of the public.",
61
2. In Lieu Fees.
Associated Home Builders Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek,6 6 is the lead-
ing California case upholding a statute authorizing cities or counties to
require, as a condition of subdivision approval, dedication of land or, in
lieu, fees for park or recreational purposes. A class action suit chal-
lenged the constitutionality of California Business & Professions Code
section 11546 and a local ordinance enacted to implement the state
statute. Plaintiffs alleged that the state statute violated due process and
equal protection as guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions
and that the statute constituted a taking of private property for public
use without just compensation in violation of the fifth amendment. Re-
jecting the arguments, the court observed that:
the subdivider realizes a profit from governmental approval of a
subdivision since his land is rendered more valuable by the fact of
subdivision, and in return for this benefit the city may require him
to dedicate a portion of his land for park purposes whenever the
influx of new residents will increase the need for park and recrea-
tional facilities.67
The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the need for the park
and recreational facilities must be attributable solely to the population
increase generated by the new subdivision to withstand constitutional
attack. The court relied on Ayres in holding that it was immaterial that
64. 34 Cal. 2d at 37, 207 P.2d at 5.
65. 34 Cal. 2d at 42, 207 P.2d at 7.
66. 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971).
67. Id. at 644, 484 P.2d at 618, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
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the city benefits as a whole from the dedication by having new city
parks or recreational facilities, or that future as well as present needs
were taken into consideration.6" Similarly, the particular subdivision
need not be the sole cause of the need for the dedication. 69 The court
also held that a sufficient nexus existed because the statute provided
that land dedication or fees were to be used only to provide park or
recreational facilities to serve the subdivision, and that the amount and
location of land or fees must bear a reasonable relationship to the use
of the facilities by the subdivision's future inhabitants.7"
The court also rejected an argument that paying the fee and then
later paying property taxes constitutes a double tax. Double taxation
exists only when "two taxes of the same character are imposed on the
same property, for the same purpose, by the same taxing authority
within the same jurisdiction during the same taxing period."7 1 The
court also said it was not arbitrary that the statute applied only to sub-
divisions and not, for example, to apartments. Because the subdivision
development is generally horizontal, while an apartment house is gen-
erally vertical, the legislature could reasonably conclude that a subdivi-
sion is larger in dimension, thus reducing to a greater extent the
available open space.72 Thus, the court seemed to approve more crea-
tive financing mechanisms.
3. Special Assessments.
County of Fresno v. Malmstrom73 held that the property tax limita-
tion imposed by Proposition 13 does not apply to special assessments
and bonds levied pursuant to the Improvement Act of 19117' and the
Municipal Improvement Act of 1913." 5 The statutes provide a proce-
dure, used for over 60 years, to charge property owners a fee who bene-
fit from improvements for public improvements, including streets,
sewers, sidewalks, water systems, lighting and public utility lines.
First, the court determined that the one percent maximum tax limi-
68. Id. at 638, 484 P.2d at 615, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 639 (citing Ayres, 34 Cal. 2d at 41,
207 P.2d at 7).
69. 4 Cal. 3d at 638, 484 P.2d at 613, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
70. Id. at 640, 484 P.2d at 611-12, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 635-36.
71. Id. at 642, 484 P.2d at 613, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
72. Id at 642-43, 484 P.2d at 614, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
73. 94 Cal. App. 3d 974, 156 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1979).
74. CAL. STs. & HIGH. CODE §§ 5000-6794 (Deering 1978).
75. CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE §§ 10,000-10,609 (Deering 1978).
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tation imposed on ad valorem taxes did not limit special assessments
and bonds levied pursuant to improvement acts. Proposition 13 sought
to control ad valorem property taxes and government spending. Spe-
cial assessments are used to finance improvements benefitting specific
parcels of property. To pay for the improvements out of general funds
would be unjust because only certain property owners would receive a
benefit. Therefore, the court decided it is consistent with the purposes
of Proposition 13 to conclude that its limitations do not apply to spe-
cial assessments.76
Second, the court found that statutory special assessments were not
"special taxes" requiring two-thirds vote. The court stated that special
assessments are not really taxes at all because they charge for benefits
to the property and thus cannot exceed the benefits the assessed prop-
erty receives from the improvement; a special tax need not benefit spe-
cific property.7 7
Similarly, in Solvang Municipal Improvement District v. Board of
Supervisors71 the court held that, despite an incongruity in Proposition
, there is no limitation on special assessments. Acting pursuant to
local and state statutes, Solvang Municipal Improvement District cre-
ated a parking district. It issued bonds to acquire three lots for public
parking. The bonds were to be paid off by imposing special assess-
ments against benefitted real property made more valuable by the in-
creased availability of public parking. Special assessments were to be
levied annually according to assessed value, accounting for the amount
of traffic generated by the establishment and amount of private parking
76. 94 Cal. App. 3d at 982, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
77. 94 Cal. App. 3d at 984, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 783.
78. 112 Cal. App. 3d 545, 169 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1980).
79. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA. Article XIIIA § 1 provides as follows:
(a) The maximum amount of any ad valorem tax on real property shall not
exceed one percent (1%) of the full cash value of such property. The one percent
(1%) tax to be collected by the counties and apportioned according to law to the
districts within the counties.
(b) The limitation provided for in subdivision (a) shall not apply to ad valorem
taxes or special assessments to pay the interest and redemption charges on any
indebtedness approved by the voters prior to the time this section becomes
effective.
Thus, subdivision (b) declares that the limitation in subdivision (a) does not apply to
special assessments or ad valorem taxes; but subdivision (a) states only that ad valorem
taxes on real property shall not exceed one percent. The Solvang court held this refer-
ence to special assessments in subdivision (b) was surplusage added due to an abun-
dance of caution. 112 Cal. App. 3d at 556, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 398.
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made available. Assessments were regularly levied and collected until,
when Proposition 13 passed, the system was challenged. The first issue
was whether Proposition 13 would apply retroactively to deprive the
bondholders of their promised source of repayment. The court held
that it cannot because to do so would impair the obligation of a validly
executed contract.8 °
The court then decided that a special assessment for local improve-
ments directly benefitting the assessed property is not within the Prop-
osition 13 one percent increase limitation on ad valorem real property
taxes. The court found a clear distinction between taxes "which are
levied for general revenue and for general public improvements; and
special assessments, which are levied for local improvements which di-
rectly benefit specific real property.""1
The court stated the initiative was directed at general government
spending and general real property taxes levied to finance such spend-
ing, not at special assessments for local improvements directly benefit-
ting specific real property.82 The court defined special assessments as
a charge imposed on particular real property for a local public
improvement of direct benefit to that property.... The rationale
of special assessments is that the assessed property has received a
special benefit over and above that received by the general public.
The general public should not be required to pay for special bene-
fits for the few, and the few specifically benefitted should not be
subsidized by the general public.83
There is nothing in Proposition 13's history that indicates it was in-
tended to encompass special assessments for local improvements bene-
fitting specific real property. Therefore, although the language of
Article XIIIA is ambiguous, the court decided Proposition 13 was not
to apply to special assessments.
4. FBAs.
To manage growth effectively and ensure that public services and
facilities were developed concurrent with need, the City of San Diego
adopted a financing mechanism called Facilities Benefit Assessment
(FBA). In 1984, the appellate courts validated the City's approach in
80. 112 Cal. App. 3d at 550, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
81. Id. at 553, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
82. Id. at 556, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 398.
83. Id. at 552, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
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J. W. Jones Cos. v. City of San Diego 4 and City of San Diego v.
Holodnak.85
The City adopted an ordinance 6 in 1980 to implement the Progress
Guide and General Plan Revision, which concerned "the acquisition,
construction and improvement of public facilities."87 The ordinance
provides that the city designate "areas of benefit." Such areas are de-
fined as lands receiving special benefits from construction, acquisition
and improvement of public facilities projects and were to be assessed
the cost of the public facilities. "Public facilities projects ' are defined
as "any and all public improvements the need for which is directly or
indirectly generated by development." 88 The Progress Guide and Gen-
eral Plan provides that certain public facilities be financed by "special
assessment proceedings, consideration from developers, the City's Gen-
eral Fund or some combination thereof."8 9
Under the FBA ordinance, after receiving a written report with an
implementation program for future development, a financing plan, or
both, and information on costs to be apportioned among the parcels in
proportion to the benefits received,' the City Council adopts a resolu-
tion of intention. 9' Protests are then heard at a hearing. If a majority
of owners disagree, the proceedings are abandoned unless the City
Council overrules the protests by an affirmative vote of four-fifths
based on the interest of the public health, safety or general welfare. If
there is no protest or the protest is overruled, the Council may order a
resolution of designation delineating the area of benefit and establishing
an FBA against each parcel. Based on this resolution, a map is then
filed with the City Clerk, and the assessments become a lien on the
property in the amount of the FBA.
The lien must be paid before building permits are issued for land
development. FBA payments are placed in a special fund to be ex-
pended solely for the purpose for which it was assessed and levied.
There is a provision in the ordinance for annual adjustments of FBAs
84. 157 Cal. App. 3d 745, 203 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1984).
85. 157 Cal. App. 3d 759, 203 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1984).
86. SAN DIEGO, CA, MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 61.2200-61.2216 (1980).
87. Id. § 61.2200(e).
88. Id. § 61.2202().
89. Id. § 61.2200(e).
90. Id. § 61.2203.
91. Id. § 61.2004.
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to reflect the changes in actual or estimated costs of the capital
improvements.
The court in J. W. Jones Cos. v. City of San Diego upheld the FBA
financing approach as a valid exercise of San Diego's power to require
undeveloped land to bear the costs of the public facilities necessary for
the health and welfare of future residents.92 The court stated that
"[t]he vision of San Diego's future as sketched in the general plan is
attainable only through the comprehensive financing scheme contem-
plated by the FBA. ' 93 The Jones court rejected the developers' argu-
ments that the FBA amounted to a special tax violating the two-thirds
voter approval requirement of the California Constitution, that it was
an invalid special assessment because it is not based on special benefits
to the assessed properties and that it violated equal protection because
it did not assess developed property.
The court found that the FBA, used to finance street improvements
and parks, was not a special tax because it did not exceed the cost of
the improvements, it was not made on an ad valorem basis and the
assessment did not result in personal liability. The court found that
contiguity was not essential to the benefit conferred because the City
considered the proximity of the parcels to the public facility.94
The court reasoned that the fact that developed property was not
assessed did not offend equal protection principles. The classification
need only have a reasonable basis, and because the proposed develop-
ment creates the need for public facilities, it is reasonable that this un-
developed land bear the cost. Existing public facilities may be
presumed to adequately serve already developed property. "The inci-
dental fallout of benefit to developed parcels does not result in such
inequality as to offend equal protection concepts."95 In addition, the
court stated that it was proper for the City to aggregate all the im-
provements in the FBA and to spread the costs to all undeveloped par-
cels in the area of benefit. This method avoids a piecemeal approach
that would "lead to a haphazard, random growth putting heavy bur-
dens on those seeking early development of their land and lighter loads
upon those coming into development at later times. ,96
The companion case, City of San Diego v. Holodnak, addressed the
92. 157 Cal. App. 3d at 758, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
93. 157 Cal. App. 3d at 758, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
94. 157 Cal. App. 3d at 756, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 588.




FBA used to finance construction of a water line, community and
neighborhood parks, a public library branch, a park and ride facility, a
fire station and a bridge expansion. The court again upheld the FBA.97
Although the community at large will benefit from these public facili-
ties, for example by having more park land or more library services, the
court said the primary benefit will be to those within the area of bene-
fit-the properties which are subject to the FBA.
5. The TIDF.
The courts upheld another unique method of facilities financing in
Russ Building Partnership v. City and County of San Francisco.9" It
involved the city's Transit Impact Development Fee Ordinance
(TIDF), which requires developers of new office space to pay a transit
fee as a condition to issuance of a certificate of completion and occu-
pancy. The fee seeks to offset increased transportation costs caused by
workers attracted by development of new downtown office space, par-
ticularly those commuting during peak hours. The plaintiff, in a class
action representing 6,000 downtown San Francisco property owners,99
argued the ordinance was an invalid development fee, claiming: (1) it
was a "special tax" requiring two-thirds voter approval under the Cali-
fornia Constitution; (2) it violated Article XIIIB of the California Con-
stitution limiting government spending;" ° (3) it violated due process
and equal protection; and (4) it constituted double taxation. The court
rejected all the arguments and upheld the fee.
The court held that the TIDF is not a tax and therefore not gov-
erned by Articles XIIIA or XIIIB of the California Constitution. Fur-
ther, the fees are limited to costs attributable to the new development,
are not earmarked for general revenue purposes and, unlike most taxes,
97. 157 Cal. App. 3d 759, 203 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1984).
98. 199 Cal. App. 3d 1496, 246 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1987). Russ Building Partnership
filed a class action suit to have the TDIF ordinance declared invalid. Others filed a
separate suit against the city challenging the retroactive application of the ordinance.
The trial judge found in favor of the city in separate trials on both issues. The Court of
Appeal upheld the validity of the ordinance and the California Supreme Court denied
Russ' petition for review, thus leaving intact the appellate court's ruling that the TDIF
is a valid development fee. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment as
to the others, and the California Supreme Court granted review. Russ Bldg. Partner-
ship v. City and County of San Francisco, 44 Cal. 3d 839, 750 P.2d 324, 244 Cal. Rptr.
682 (1988). The California Supreme Court held that the TIDF may be imposed on the
project without impairing the developers' vested rights.
99. 44 Cal. 3d at 845 n.4, 750 P.2d at 326 n.4, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 684 n.4.
100. See supra Part II.B. for discussion of the Gann limit.
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are not compulsory, but are only required if the property owner de-
cides to develop office space.1 The court found the TIDF consistent
with the purpose of Article XIIIA, and the TIDF is not subject to
Article XIIIB because it is not a special tax, nor a regulatory license,
user fee or charge.
The court rejected the equal protection and due process arguments
because it is rational to conclude that new office space increases the
transportation need during peak hours. The imposition of a fee is not
arbitrary and unreasonable, the court stated, and the fact there is inci-
dental benefit to existing buildings is not of such magnitude that it vio-
lates equal protection. 2 The court found that the TIDF did not
constitute double taxation, because it is not imposed on the basis of
property ownership, but rather as "a fee for the privilege of developing
real property and to defer increased costs of transit services., 1 0 3 It is
charged only at the time of completing construction and does not re-
cur, as do property taxes.' 4
C. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission
Although California courts have been quite tolerant of creative fi-
nancing methods needed to allow growth to occur in an orderly fash-
ion, local governments must be cognizant of limitations imposed by the
United States Supreme Court. During the 1987 term, the Court
handed down three cases dealing with different aspects of the "takings"
issue. These cases help define permissible use of the police power to
regulate land use.105 In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission '6
101. 199 Cal. App. 3d at 1505, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
102. 199 Cal. App. 3d at 1509, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 27-28.
103. 199 Cal. App. 3d at 1510, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 28.
104. 199 Cal. App. 3d at 1516, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 27-28.
105. Although these cases are often discussed together, this article will not discuss
the first two cases because they are only tangentially related to financing. Keystone
Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987), involved a Pennsylvania
statute that regulated coal mine operations. The court rejected the claim that this stat-
ute on its face constituted a taking because it was enacted for the general welfare and
did not deprive coal mine operators of all economically viable use of their property
interests. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304 (1987), did not address whether there was a "taking," rather it involved the
remedy for a temporary taking. The court held that monetary damages were an avail-
able remedy for a taking, not merely invalidation of the ordinance. For a complete
discussion of this trio of cases, see Freilich & Carlisle, The U.S. Supreme Court Block-
busters of 1986-1987- Analyzing the Inverse Condemnation and Regulatory Taking
Cases in PLANNING, ZONING & EMINENT DoMAIN (1988).
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the Supreme Court reversed a California Court of Appeals decision
and held the Coastal Commission's actions forcing an easement de-
prived plaintiffs of their property without just compensation in viola-
tion of the fifth amendment to the Constitution. The Nollan decision
was a narrow one, but it is an important case dealing with land use
regulation and reiterates the requirement of an "essential nexus" be-
tween a regulation's impact and its objective.
Important in the Court's opinion about financing mechanisms is its
statement that heightened scrutiny is required where actual convey-
ance of a property interest is made a condition to the lifting of a land
use regulation, "since in that context there is heightened risk that the
purpose is avoidance of the compensation requirement, rather than the
stated police power objective."1 ° Although "permanent physical oc-
cupation" is not the objective in most land use regulatory situations, in
enacting financing mechanisms such as impact fees, the regulations
must meet the "essential nexus" or reasonable relationship test enunci-
ated in Nollan. Obviously, the standard is easier to meet if there is no
physical occupation of the property.
IV. FACILITIES FINANCING ToOLS
In order to progress to the second step in growth management, facil-
ities financing, the San Diego City Council authorized formation of a
citizens committee to review the City Manager's long-term financing
plan for public facilities. Popularly called the Citizens Finance Com-
mittee, the group sought to review standards for public facilities and
the cost of meeting those standards, seek and encourage public partici-
pation in financing decisions and advise the Mayor and City Council
about the most appropriate financing methods.
The committee divided its work into three major parts: (1) needs
appraisal, to examine existing, desired and projected levels of services
and public facilities and to develop criteria for evaluation and priori-
tization of needs; (2) capitalfinancing, to examine existing and alterna-
tive vehicles and options to fund various capital facilities; and (3)
operating revenue, to examine existing and alternative revenue sources
that might be used in funding appropriate levels of service. The goals
include remedying deficiencies in existing infrastructure, funding oper-
106. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
107. Id. at 841.
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ation and maintenance costs and devising financing mechanisms to en-
able new development to pay for its share of growth.
A. Needs Appraisal
The City's strategy for financing facilities includes a comprehensive
prioritization of regional needs. An overview report on funding needs
for public facilities for the San Diego region was provided to the Citi-
zens Finance Committee. During the next twenty years the City will
need $2.26 billion for construction and acquisition of public facilities.
Only $1.01 billion can be anticipated from existing sources, leaving a
$1.25 billion shortfall to be obtained from funding sources yet to be
identified. '08 Other jurisdictions in the region will also be pursuing
their own capital programs. For example, San Diego County will need
about $12 million for courts, jails and open space; various school dis-
tricts will require $2.25 billion for construction; and various transpor-
tation providers will demand $4 billion for streets, freeways and
transit.
In considering financing options, it is important to distinguish vari-
ous communities, particularly older "urbanized" areas and newer
"planned urbanizing" areas. For instance, the current San Diego Gen-
eral Plan, adopted in 1979, differentiates between types of communi-
ties, how their facilities should be funded and the standards under
which the facilities will be built and operated.
Of the forty-nine community plan areas within the City, thirty-four
are classified in the General Plan as urbanized and fifteen are classified
as planned urbanizing. The urbanized communities contain approxi-
mately 337,500 existing dwelling units. Projections reveal that these
communities can accommodate 74,000 new dwelling units for a total
buildout of 411,500. Based on these figures, therefore, the urbanized
communities are now developed to eighty-two percent of their planned
capacity.
Urbanized communities were generally developed prior to the cur-
rent facility standards and financing policy. To overcome urban facil-
ity deficiencies, the 1979 General Plan proposed that urbanized
communities receive capital funds from gas and sales taxes. This ap-
proach, however, was restricted by Proposition 13's effect on revenue
from property taxes, which lead to the proposed use of gas and sales
108. This figure does not include $2.8 billion that must be identified for the "Clean
Water Program" to provide the improvement of our ocean discharges to secondary level
and increase reclamation for the region.
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taxes for operation and maintenance costs. Generally, the urbanized
areas suffer from relatively small revenue, amounts generated from
fees and charges coming from new development, while large funding
needs remain.
The fifteen planned urbanizing area communities contain about
87,200 existing dwelling units. Projections show that they can accom-
modate 71,500 additional units, for a total buildout capacity of
158,700. The fifteen communities are at about fifty-four percent of
their development capacity. The 1979 General Plan proposed that
each community bear the cost of the entire infrastructure required to
serve it. Impact fees and assessments entirely fund streets, parks, li-
braries and fire stations, but not operating, maintenance and replace-
ment costs.
B. Financing Techniques
Facilities financing in the 1990s requires consideration of a broad
range of financing tools, some of which are tied to the land use process.
Different techniques must be used in combination to accomplish the
City's goals. The funding strategy for public facilities should be tai-
lored to the type of facility and other factors such as: (1) the service
area of the facility; (2) the level of development of the area served; (3)
the public perception of need; (4) the relationship between need and
type of funding and (5) the constraints on use of various funding
devices.
In reviewing the City's needs, the Citizens Finance Committee eval-
uated several revenue raising techniques to meet capital financing and
operating revenue needs. They included a Gann waiver, general obli-
gation bonds, revenue supported issues such as revenue bonds or certif-
icates of participation, development impact fees, special assessments,
Mello-Roos districts," 9 reevaluation of sale versus lease of city-owned
real estate, an initiative that would require the state to return to cities a
"fair share" of state income taxes, a utility user tax, increased state
gasoline taxes and motor vehicle fees, additional fees for certain city
programs to ensure full cost recovery, a city lottery, raising taxes on
card rooms, false alarm fees, parking user fees for parking lots, parking
fees in the beach communities, taxes on entertainment tickets, in-
creased business license taxes, privatization of some facilities and serv-
109. See Mello-Roos Community Facilities Act of 1982, CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§ 53311 - 53365.7 (Deering 1989).
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ices, refuse collection fees, port district revenue sharing and increased
transient occupancy taxes.
Obviously, most of the revenue techniques are of broad application.
They are capable of relieving general fund shortfalls without applica-
tion to facility and service funding in growth areas. But they are use-
ful, too, in meeting growth-induced financial needs. Instead of
addressing all of the techniques, this Article will discuss some of the
more important ones.
1. Land Use Tools.
a. Citywide Impact Fees and Regional Impact Fees.
New growth burdens not only the local infrastructure needed to
meet demands of a new community, but certain existing citywide and
regionwide facilities as well. One financing tool to compensate for the
additional load is the citywide and regionwide impact fee.
Citywide and regionwide impact fees target facilities affecting an
area larger than just one or two community planning areas. Certain
facilities may be of citywide or regionwide benefit, when taken as a
whole. Therefore, they are included in the citywide or regionwide im-
pact fee base.110 The fees add to already existing development fees.
Citywide and regionwide impact fees, however, will be used for
projects considered to benefit the City as a whole rather than individual
or small groups of communities. The responsibility for funding a pro-
ject is allocated on a "fair share" basis between existing development
and new development.
An example of a citywide burden is the central library. Without in-
cremental increases in the Library's budget each year.to match popula-
tion growth, more people use the existing library facilities. A citywide
impact fee would be based on the current level of service, charging new
development a fee to maintain that level on a per capita basis. Propos-
als currently exist in San Diego to initiate citywide impact fees for the
central library, fire, police and public works operations stations and
parks and recreation. A procedural ordinance is being drafted for this
purpose.
Other facilities, not under the city's responsibility but nevertheless
burdened by new growth, are courts, jails and parks and recreational
facilities built and operated by county government, but serving city res-
idents. New development naturally results in population increase,
110. The City of San Diego, CA. Managers Report, No. 89-283 (June 2, 1989).
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which places an added burden on already crowded courts and jails.
The existing facilities, currently funded by the County of San Diego,
are insufficient. The County has resorted to setting up courtrooms in
hotel rooms across the street from the crowded county courthouse.
Jails are overcrowded and well above their rated capacities. Current
law enforcement policies, calling for citing and releasing all but felons
and violent misdemeanants, affect the quality of life for all San
Diegans.
A regionwide impact fee would place the burden of new develop-
ment on a per capita basis to maintain the current level or capacity of
service of the criminal justice system. To the extent that citywide im-
pact fees prove effective, countywide fees also may be required. As
with all impact fees, citywide and regionwide fees must meet the "ra-
tional nexus" test. That is, a connection must exist between the new
development and imposition of the fee. It must be shown that the new
growth places additional burdens on the facilities which are to benefit
from the fee and that the fee is in proportion to the need generated by
the development.
As of January 1, 1989, the California Government Code requires
certain findings whenever a local agency establishes, increases or im-
poses a fee as a condition of approval of a development project.1"' The
local agency must: (1) identify the purpose of the fee; (2) identify the
use to which the fee is to be put (if the use is financing public facilities,
the facilities must be identified); (3) determine how there is a reason-
able relationship between the fee's use and the type of development
project on which the fee is imposed; and (4) determine if there is a
reasonable relationship between the need for the public facility and the
type of development project on which the fee is imposed." 2
The local agency must then determine if there is a reasonable rela-
tionship between the amount of the fee and the cost of all or part of the
public facility attributable to the development on which the fee is im-
posed. "'3 To counter developers' frequent arguments that large
amounts of fees are collected but few are spent, the legislation also re-
quires annual findings regarding unexpended or uncommitted fees five
or more years after their receipt. If the proper findings cannot be
made, then the local agency must begin a refund procedure to return
111. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66000-66009 (Deering 1989).
112. Id. at § 66001(a)(1)(4).
113. Id. at § 66001(b).
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the fees to the current record owners of the lots or units. 114
Because impact fees are not "proceeds of taxes," the Gann limit does
not affect their appropriation.' 15 They are also not subject to Proposi-
tion 13's limitations1 16 because they are not ad valorem property taxes
and, similar to the FBA approach validated in Jones and Holodnak, "7
would not be considered "special taxes" requiring two-thirds voter
approval.
b. Special Districts.
A special assessment district is a financing tool which apportions the
benefit received when public improvements are constructed by benefit-
ted properties. A major advantage of special districts is that they are
not subject to either the Gann limit or Proposition 13's limitations. 8
(1) Citywide Landscaping, Light and Park Assessment Districts.
The Landscaping and Lighting Act of 1972"9 provides a procedure
for making certain improvements and maintaining them through an
assessment district procedure. Under this scheme the legislative body
designates the geographic area that the improvements will benefit.' 20
Improvements that may be constructed under the statute include in-
stallation or planting of landscaping; statues, fountains and other orna-
mental structures and facilities; public lighting facilities; recreational
facilities, such as lights, playground equipment, play courts, public
restrooms and all necessary work for their construction and the acqui-
sition of parks. I21 The statute requires a report establishing individual
assessments, followed by a public hearing before levy of assessments.
Although the statute is limited in the types of improvements which
can be financed in this manner, it is effective for the types designated.
The authorized financing mechanism will free money from the general
fund for other needed services.
114. Id. at § 66001(d)-(e).
115. See supra Part II.B. for discussion of the Gann Limit.
116. See supra Part II.A. for discussion of Proposition 13 limitations.
117. See supra Part III.B.4..
118. See supra Part II.
119. CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE §§ 22500-22679 (West Supp. 1990).
120. Id. at § 22503.
121. Id. at § 22525 (Deering 1989).
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(2) Fire Suppression District (FSD).
Pursuant to state legislation,122 local agencies can also levy an as-
sessment for fire department services to obtain or maintain fire suppres-
sion equipment or pay salaries or benefits for fire-fighters. The
legislative body must set rates based on certain findings and standards
set for various categories of suppression services. Notice is then given
and protests are heard. If there is less than a five percent (by value)
protest, the legislative body levies the fees. If the protest is more than
five percent but less than fifty percent the matter goes to a vote. A
simple majority vote is required to establish the fee. However, the pro-
ceedings must be abandoned if the protest is over fifty percent.
The fees are a form of special assessment and are based on special
benefits conferred by the activity funded. An analogy can be drawn to
funding police activities. Both types of services provide the same sort
of benefits to the assessed property. Due to the unique nature of this
type of financing mechanism, it would seem advisable to institute a
validation proceeding to assure its legal validity.
(3) Facilities Benefit Assessment (FBA).
Another financing tool effectively used in San Diego for developing
properties is the FBA. This approach was discussed in detail in an
earlier section of this Article. 123
2. Non-Land Use Tools (Other Techniques).
a. Business License Taxes.
San Diego currently assesses extremely low business license fees 124
and ranks lowest in business tax collections among major cities in Cali-
fornia on a gross revenue or per capita basis.125 Because business li-
cense taxes are not generally an important factor in deciding where to
operate a business, 126 in a city such as San Diego they can be an effec-
122. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 50078-50078.20 (Deering 1989).
123. See supra Part III.B.4.
124. San Diego's fees include a flat $30 fee per business license plus $2.00 per
employee.
125. San Diego Housing Trust Fund Feasibility Study, Revenue Profiles, Table 18;
prepared by David Paul Rosen & Associates (June 28, 1989).
126. A nationwide survey of business location executives conducted by Location
Management Services found that the most important factors in deciding where to oper-
ate a business were quality of life issues such as affordable housing, traffic congestion
and air quality.
1990]
Washington University Open Scholarship
150 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 38:115
tive revenue raising technique.
As opposed to charter cities, however, business license taxes are not
available to California general law cities to raise revenue. General law
cities may not impose a license tax exceeding the cost of regulating the
business or which is unrelated to any regulatory purpose.' 27 Business
license taxes may be assessed on a variety of bases, such as a flat fee, a
percentage of either payroll expenses or gross receipts or the number of
employees. There may be exemptions for small businesses.
In City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell,128 the court deter-
mined that because a city's payroll and gross receipts tax was not a
"special tax" under Proposition 13, it did not require two-thirds voter
approval. The proceeds of the city's tax were placed into the city's
general fund, to be used for general governmental expenditures. To
hold otherwise would effectively read the word "special" out of the
language of section 4 of Proposition 13. The court instead construed
the term "special taxes" to mean taxes which are levied for a specific
purpose rather than, as with the gross receipt taxes at issue, a levy
placed in the general fund to be utilized for general governmental uses.
The court found this interpretation consistent with the purpose of
Proposition 13, in giving "effective" property tax relief, because a two-
thirds vote is still required for the adoption of "special taxes" as de-
fined by the court.'29
The major problem with a business license tax in payroll or gross
receipts tax form is whether it is a prohibited local income tax. 30
Before imposing such a tax, a local government must proceed cau-
tiously, making certain the tax legislation is carefully drafted and cor-
rectly adopted. 131
b. Privatization.
Privatization means return of a government function to the private
sector or adoption by government of other market-oriented mecha-
nisms to perform the function. Cost-saving methods unavailable to
127. C6oper v. Michael, 157 Cal. App. 2d 176, 64 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1967).
128. 32 Cal. 3d 47, 648 P.2d 935, 184 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1982).
129. 32 Cal. 3d at 57, 648 P.2d at 940, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
130. CAL REv. & TAX CODE § 17052.1 (Deering 1989) (repealed) prohibits local
governments from colecting any income taxes, but allowed "any otherwise authorized
license tax upon a business measured by or according to gross receipts."
131. See Weekes v. City of Oakland, 21 Cal. 3d 386, 579 P.2d 449, 146 Cal. Rptr.
558 (1978) (discussion of the distinction between a business license tax and income tax).
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government may allow a private firm to perform the service at a lower
cost to government while the firm still earns a profit. Contract bidding
is one means of testing the water to determine whether a private mar-
ket exists and, if so, whether a private firm may provide a service more
cheaply than the government. Contract bidding may result in a least-
cost service. Because the lowest bid may not translate into the best
service, however, it may be necessary to award a bid on the basis of
both price and quality.
What functions can be "privatized" will depend on the needs and
circumstances of a particular municipality. In San Diego, a likely tar-
get for privatization appears to be refuse collection. Currently, a 1919
ordinance adopted by the electorate prohibits San Diego from charging
a user fee for trash collection. 132 This service cost San Diego approxi-
mately $20 million in 1989. In 1990, that figure is budgeted at $23
million. Thus, besides the potential for creating lower cost service,
privatization of refuse disposal may allow San Diego to evade its cur-
rent inability to collect fees for the cost of its collection service. Unfor-
tunately, a repeal or amendment of the 1919 ordinance requires a vote
of the people.
In a sense, local government has practiced privatization for a long
time. Examples include the common practice of trash collection per-
formed by private firms, utility services by investor-owned energy and
water companies, and security for public buildings and facilities by pri-
vate patrol services. Consideration may someday be given to private
construction and operation of buildings or facilities to be jointly used
by government and the private sector. The U.S. Navy is currently pro-
posing such a development on waterfront property it owns in down-
town San Diego.
c. Utility User Tax.
A tax on the use of utility service is another possible revenue-raising
technique. Utility user's taxes may be imposed on the consumption of
electricity, gas, cable and telephone services, including long distance
telephone services. Charter cities may enact taxes on the use of utility
services without conflicting with state law.133 The utility users tax
132. SAN DIEGO MUNICIPAL CODE § 66.0123.
133. Riviera v. City of Fresno, 6 Cal. 3d 132, 490 P.2d 793, 98 Cal. Rptr. 281
(1971). The State Sales and Use Tax is set out in CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 6001-
7176 (Deering 1975). The Bradley-Bums Uniform Local Sales and Use Tax Law is
found in CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 7200-7209 (Deering 1975).
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must be aimed at the utility user, rather than the utility supplier. How-
ever, the city can compel the utility supplier to collect the tax.13 4
A utility user's tax was found not to be a "special tax" requiring
two-thirds voter approval under Proposition 13.135 Such a tax is al-
lowed as long as the money obtained from the tax goes into the City's
general fund and is not earmarked for specific uses.
More than eighty California cities impose utility user's taxes ranging
from 1.5 percent to 11 percent. San Diego is not one of them. A flat
rate utility users tax is inherently regressive because lower income
households pay a tax which is a higher percentage of their income.
Therefore, many cities provide exemptions or credits from utility user's
taxes to low income households.
3. Financing Techniques Requiring Voter Approval.
a. Fair Share Initiative.
A statewide initiative is being proposed for the June 1990 ballot that
would distribute a 10 percent share of state income tax revenues to all
California cities and counties based on their percentage of the state's
population. Adoption of the initiative would result in over $80 million
annually for San Diego based on its pro rata share. The San Diego
City Council passed a resolution on July 10, 1989, which endorses the
concept of the initiative. State revenues generally rise at a faster rate
than inflation. It is believed that earmarking the state income tax gen-
erated in excess of the inflation rate for distribution to local govern-
ments will result in a phase-in period over four years.
Although the Fair Share initiative has merit, caution must be exer-
cised if such action is pursued. There is the potential of action at the
state level in the form of replacement taxes and fees which would result
in an undesirable overall tax burden on local governments.
b. General Obligation Bonds.
General obligation bonds are defined as bonds backed by general tax
revenues." 6 The financing is secured by an ad valorem tax rate on real
property and can be used for most types of public facility projects and
land acquisition. Generally considered the least risky form of state or
134. City of Modesto v. Modesto Irrigation Dist., 34 Cal. App. 3d 504, 110 Cal.
Rptr. 111 (1973).
135. Felton v. City of Delano, 162 Cal. App. 3d 400, 208 Cal. Rptr. 486 (1984).
136. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 162 (5th ed. 1979).
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local debt obligation, the borrowing price to the government is re-
duced. Exemption of interest paid on the bonds from federal income
tax on the bondholder has also helped to keep financing cost down. In
the past, interest rates for general obligation bonds have been as much
as one percent lower than other forms of financing. In addition, the
requirements for funded interest during the construction or acquisition
period and for a debt service reserve are eliminated.
Proposition 46, passed by the voters in June 1986, allows local gov-
ernments to levy property taxes above the one percent limit imposed by
Proposition 13 to pay debt service on bonds which have received the
necessary two-thirds voter approval. The political disadvantages of
general obligation bond financing include the requirement of a two-
thirds majority for approval of an issue and the negative impact of debt
service on property taxes.
c. Gann Waiver
As discussed previously, 137 voters may approve a temporary waiver
of the Gann Limit, limited to four years. This waiver does not provide
additional revenues to the local government or allow financing of addi-
tional services; it only allows the local government to maintain current
levels of service. In San Diego, the current Gann waiver expires on
June 30, 1991. It is currently expected that the City of San Diego will
receive between $250 and $450 million in tax revenues above its Gann
Limit over the four fiscal years 1992 through 1995. Therefore, part of
the City's long-term financing plan includes having another Gann
Waiver placed on the ballot.
d. Senate Constitutional Amendment I (SCA 1).
As discussed previously, there will be a proposed constitutional
amendment on the June 1990 ballot. Commonly called SCA 1, the
Amendment will liberalize the annual adjustment to the Gann limit to
reflect the rate of economic growth more accurately. Instead of being
tied to the Consumer Price Index, the change in cost of living will be
measured by the change in California per capita personal income,
which has been growing faster than the CPI.
C. Citizen Response
At the time of this writing, two citizen groups have filed their inten-
137. See supra Part II.B.
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tions to circulate petitions to collect signatures for growth management
initiatives. Implicit in this action is the perception by some segments of
the community that the current growth management policies are not
working effectively and that the likelihood of a City Council orches-
trated solution is slim. Both proposals emphasize the need for (1) iden-
tifying effective financing methods for necessary public improvements
and (2) construction timing which provides completed facilities at the
time they are needed.
Despite the similarity in goals, the two citizen proposals are very
different in their methodology. The Planned Growth Initiative re-
quires that all applications for discretionary permits submit detailed
traffic congestion and fiscal balance analyses and certify that adequate
public facilities shall be available prior to or concurrent with need.
Traffic standards and public facility levels of service are the driving
forces in this citizens' measure. Mitigation measures in the Planned
Growth Initiative include construction of public improvements,
changes in density, phasing and scheduling plans; but emphasis seems
placed on the contribution of fees in an amount sufficient to pay for the
applicant's proportionate share of any required mitigation measures.
The second initiative, called San Diego City Traffic Control and
Comprehensive Growth Management Initiative (San Diego 2000), fo-
cuses on traffic control through the completion of the regional trans-
portation system. This goal is accomplished through the imposition on
new development of a comprehensive transportation impact fee and
mandatory transportation demand management program. Specific im-
provements are identified in the measure as well as a fee cap of $200
per average daily trip.
The preparation and circulation of these two initiative measures in-
dicates a citizen attempt to help conclude the process of reevaluating
the City's growth management policies. The Progress Guide and Gen-
eral Plan review commenced in January 1987 was never fully com-
pleted. While policy direction was given by the City Council following
the defeat of Propositions H and J in November 1988, the comprehen-
sive review called for in early 1987 was never finished. Some citizens
fear that tough fiscal times will direct Council attention to issues of
basic City services rather than to the job of defining service levels, iden-
tifying funding sources and establishing timing of construction for pub-
lic facilities needed for new development. Permitting growth to
proceed without tackling these basic issues could jeopardize San Di-




San Diego enters the 1990s with legislative and electoral policy deci-
sions made in the late 1980s supporting continuing growth and devel-
opment of the community. At the same time, however, the City is
strongly committed to assuring that all aspects of the quality of life
remains high. The focus is appropriately upon facilities, their level of
service, time of construction and, most importantly, funding sources.
The City has analyzed the range of financial approaches available and
has decided to use several techniques as the first methods to be imple-
mented in San Diego.
However, a significant political question remains: Why is all this
necessary? The agony and ecstasy of the search for and discovery of
adequate means to finance the public facilities and services needed by
growing California communities could have been avoided altogether
through establishment of a coordinated, comprehensive, fair tax policy
by the California Legislature and Congress. Lacking that, the electo-
rate took it upon itself to resolve perceived inequities in a piecemeal
fashion. Without meaningful tax reform, local government financing
troubles will persist throughout the last decade of the 20th Century
and beyond.
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